What about a constitutional principle regarding the constitutional organisation of a State, such as the separation of powers, in the case-law of an international human rights court, such as the European Court of Human Rights? Although it would be daring to prove that the Strasbourg judge applies to a certain extent the theory of separation of powers, it is nevertheless relevant to answer whether the adopted solutions by the judge of the European Court of Human Rights outline, according to him/her, a coherent vision of how the relations among such powers should be drawn.

In addition, one shall not ignore the fact that the theory of separation of powers, as conceived in the context of contemporary liberal States, does not imply but the recognition that a minimum base of solutions is granted. It is therefore evident that the primary aspiration of separation of powers resides in the protection of judiciary and legislative powers, rather than the executive one. The judge of the European Court of Human Rights adopts this position. If the principle of separation of powers is not a principle enounced by the Court, at least with the precision required, it remains a principle already existent in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court with a promising future.